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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 11-3341 
_______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
LENNIE HINES, a/k/a DIRTY 
 
       LENNIE HINES,  
        Appellant 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 1-09-cr-00381-004) 
District Judge:  Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 17, 2012 
_______________ 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, AMBRO and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 17, 2012) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
Lennie Hines pled guilty to one count of unlawfully manufacturing, distributing, 
and possessing with the intent to manufacture and distribute a mixture and substance 
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containing a detectable amount of cocaine hydrochloride and cocaine base in violation of 
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  The District Court sentenced him to 84 months’ imprisonment, 
followed by three years’ supervised release.  Additionally, the Court imposed a $1,000 
fine and a $100 special assessment.  Hines filed a timely notice of appeal.  His attorney 
now moves to withdraw as counsel under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 
asserting that all potential grounds for appeal are frivolous.  Hines has not filed a pro se 
brief.  We grant the motion and affirm the judgment and sentence of the District Court. 
I. 
 Because we write solely for the parties, we recite only those facts necessary to our 
decision.  In November 2009, Hines and eight others were indicted for violating 
§ 841(a)(1).  After the Government filed a Superseding Information, limiting the charge, 
Hines and the Government agreed in a written plea agreement that he would plead guilty 
to the one-count Superseding Information and the Government would recommend an 
adjusted offense level of 27, consisting of a base offense level of 30 (reflecting that an 
amount less than 150 grams should be used to determine the advisory range under the 
Sentencing Guidelines) and a three-step reduction for Hines’ acceptance of responsibility.  
Hines later appeared before the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, 
pled guilty, and waived his right to indictment by grand jury.   
 Thereafter, the United States Probation Office prepared a Pre-Sentence Report 
(“PSR”).  The PSR held Hines responsible for more drugs than he and the Government 
agreed in his plea agreement.  As a result, it recommended a higher base offense level (32 
instead of 30) and a higher adjusted offense level (29 instead of 27) than his plea 
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agreement.  Hines objected to the PSR and argued for an adjusted offense level of 27, 
which resulted in an advisory Guidelines’ range of 100 to 125 months in light of his 
criminal history category.  He also asked the District Court to consider the factors set 
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), depart from the 100 to 125-month range, and impose a 
sentence of 84 months’ imprisonment. 
 At sentencing, the parties agreed that Hines’ base offense level was 28 and his 
adjusted offense level was 25, taking into account a three three-step reduction for his 
acceptance of responsibility.  After taking into account Hines’ criminal history category, 
the District Court calculated the advisory Guidelines’ range to be 84 to 105 months’ 
imprisonment.  After considering the § 3553(a) factors, the Court, as noted, imposed a 
sentence of 84 months’ imprisonment.   
II. 
 Our rules provide that “[w]here, upon review of the district court record, counsel 
is persuaded that the appeal presents no issue of even arguable merit, counsel may file a 
motion to withdraw and supporting brief pursuant to Anders.”  3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a).  
If we concur with trial counsel’s assessment, we “will grant [the] Anders motion, and 
dispose of the appeal without appointing new counsel.”  Id.  Accordingly, our inquiry “is 
. . . twofold: (1) whether counsel adequately fulfilled the rule’s requirements; and (2) 
whether an independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.”  United 
States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).  
In his Anders brief, Hines’ attorney identified three potential grounds for direct 
appeal: (1) the District Court’s jurisdiction; (2) the validity of Hines’ guilty plea; and (3) 
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the reasonableness of Hines’ sentence.  Our review of the record confirms counsel’s 
assessment that there are no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. 
First, we agree that the District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  
Pursuant to that section, federal district courts have jurisdiction over all offenses 
committed against the laws of the United States.   
Second, we uphold the validity of Hines’ guilty plea.  The District Court 
conducted an extensive plea colloquy complying with the standards set forth in Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.  At his plea 
hearing, Hines was advised of his rights and the consequences of pleading guilty.  App. 
46-69.  The Court reviewed the charge of unlawful distribution of controlled substances, 
the statutory maximum penalties, and Hines’ waiver of his right to a grand jury 
indictment.  Id.  It also complied with the specific colloquy requirements set out in 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c), advising Hines of the federal criminal trial 
rights that he waived by pleading guilty.  Id. 
Finally, we agree that Hines’ sentence is procedurally and substantively 
reasonable.  District courts must follow a three-step process in imposing a sentence: (1) 
calculate the applicable Guidelines range; (2) formally rule on any departure motions and 
explain its ruling on such motions; and (3) exercise discretion in applying any relevant 
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d 
Cir. 2006).  At sentencing, the Court accepted the parties’ stipulation to apply the updated 
drug quantity table, assigning Hines a base offense level of 28, rather than 30 as set out in 
the plea agreement, and an adjusted offense level of 25, accounting for the three-step 
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acceptance-of-responsibility reduction.  App. 92-94.  Combined with a Criminal History 
Category of IV, the Court calculated Hines’ Guidelines range to be 84-105 months.  App. 
93-94.  No parties motioned for variances from the Guidelines’ range; however, the Court 
heard arguments in favor of a lenient sentence in light of several § 3553(a) factors, 
including Hines’ status as a fiancé and as a father of a young boy and his claim that he 
was led astray by ill-disposed peers in the scheme to help raise money for his family.  
App. 94-98.  The Court stated that because Hines’ record also reflected a history of 
criminal activity involving illegal firearm possession and drug charges, it should adhere 
to the Guidelines range that “accurately take[s] care of . . . [Hines’] criminal history, the 
likelihood of recidivism, and an appropriate amount of deterrence . . . .”  App. 99-101.  
Inasmuch as Hines’ 84-month sentence followed proper procedures and was at the low 
end of his Guidelines’ range, we cannot say that the sentence was either procedurally or 
substantively unreasonable.        
*    *    *    *    * 
 Hines’ counsel adequately fulfilled the requirements of Anders.  Because our 
independent review of the record fails to reveal any nonfrivolous grounds for direct 
appeal, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm Hines’ sentence.   
 
